The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct(I***N=9780521071727) mobi 下载 网盘 caj lrf pdf txt 阿里云

　　In this work the authors present a general theory of

bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large ***anizati***

and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and

business corporati***. The theory uses the methods of standard

neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles:

that members of an ***anization trade with one another and that

they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for

conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite

reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued,

however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis

of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered

because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between

members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The

authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while

horizontal ones impede it.

1. Preliminary survey

2. Public and private policies

3. A theory of selective behaviour

4. The accumulation of trust

5. The compensation of bureaucrats

6. The size distribution of bureaus

7. Some applicati***

8. Concluding observati*** and agenda.

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