Assessing rational expectati*** 2评估合理预测 2：经济学的"析出"稳定性 mobi 下载 网盘 caj lrf pdf txt 阿里云

The rational expectati*** hypothesis （REH） dominates economic modeling in areas ranging from monetary theory， macroeconomics， and general equilibrium to finance。In this book， Roger Guesnerie continues the critical ***ysis of the REH begun in his Assessing Rational Expectati***： Sunspot Multiplicity and Economic Fluctuati***， which dealt with the questi*** raised by multiplicity and its implicati*** for a theory of endogenous fluctuati***。 This second volume emphasizes "eductive" learning： relying on careful reasoning， agents must deduce what other agents guess， a process that differs from the standard evolutionary learning experience in which agents make decisi*** about the future based on past experiences。 A broad “eductive” stability test is proposed that includes common knowledge and results in a unique“rationalizable expectati*** equilibrium。” This test provides the basis for Guesnerie's theoretical assessment of the plausibility of the REH's expectational coordination， emphasizing， for different categories of economic models， conditi*** for the REH's success or failure。

Guesnerie begins by presenting the concepts and methods of the eductive stability ***ysis in selected partial equilibrium models。 He then explores to what extent general equilibrium strategic complementarities interfere with partial equilibrium c***iderati*** in the formation of stable expectati***。 Guesnerie next examines two issues relating to eductive stability in financial market models， speculation and asymmetric price information。 The dynamic settings of an infinite horizon model are then taken up， and particular standard and generalized saddle-path soluti*** are scrutinized。 Guesnerie concludes with a review of general questi*** and some "cautious" remarks on the policy implicati*** of his ***ysis。

ⅠEductive Stability：Introductory Analysis and Overview

1 An exploration of the eductive justificati*** of the rational-expectati*** hypothesis

　2 Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability

　3 Anchoring economic predicti*** in common knowledge

Ⅱ General Equilibrium Expectati***：From Macroeconomics to Microeconomics

4 Short-run expectational coordination ：fixed versus flexible wages

　5 On the robustness of the ***ysis of expectational coordination ：from 3 to n + 2 goods

　6 Eductive stability in sequential exchange economies ：an introduction 171

Ⅲ Coordination in Finnce Models

7 (De)stabilizing speculation on futures markets ：an alternative viewpoint

　8 Common knowledge and the information revealed through prices ：some conjectures

　9 Do prices transmit rationally expected information?

　10 Eductively stable transmission of information through prices ：a brief review of results

Ⅳ Intertemporal Eductive Stability

11 Successes and failures in coordinating expectati***

　12 Coordination on saddle-path soluti*** ： the eductive viewpoint - linear univariate models

　13 Comparing expectational stability criteria in dynamic models ：a preparatory overview

Ⅴ Conclusion

14 The government and the market expectati***

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书籍介绍

The rational expectati*** hypothesis (REH) dominates economic modeling in areas ranging from monetary theory, macroeconomics, and general equilibrium to finance. In this book, Roger Guesnerie continues the critical ***ysis of the REH begun in his Assessing Rational Expectati***: Sunspot Multiplicity and Economic Fluctuati***, which dealt with the questi*** raised by multiplicity and its implicati*** for a theory of endogenous fluctuati***. This second volume emphasizes "eductive" learning: relying on careful reasoning, agents must deduce what other agents guess, a process that differs from the standard evolutionary learning experience in which agents make decisi*** about the future based on past experiences. A broad "eductive" stability test is proposed that includes common knowledge and results in a unique "rationalizable expectati*** equilibrium." This test provides the basis for Guesnerie's theoretical assessment of the plausibility of the REH's expectational coordination, emphasizing, for different categories of economic models, conditi*** for the REH's success or failure.Guesnerie begins by presenting the concepts and methods of the eductive stability ***ysis in selected partial equilibrium models. He then explores to what extent general equilibrium strategic complementarities interfere with partial equilibrium c***iderati*** in the formation of stable expectati***. Guesnerie next examines two issues relating to eductive stability in financial market models, speculation and asymmetric price information. The dynamic settings of an infinite horizon model are then taken up, and particular standard and generalized saddle-path soluti*** are scrutinized. Guesnerie concludes with a review of general questi*** and some "cautious" remarks on the policy implicati*** of his ***ysis.